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Abstract
Structural change involves a broad set of trends: (i) sectoral reallo-
cations, (ii) rich movements of productive activities between home and
market, and (iii) an increase in the scale of productive units. After ex-
tending these facts, we develop a model to explain them within a uniﬁed
framework. The crucial distinction between manufacturing, services, and
home production is the scale of the productive unit. Scale technologies
give rise to industrialization and the marketization of previously home
produced activities. The rise of mass consumption leads to an expansion
of manufacturing, but a reversal of the marketization process for service
industries. Finally, the later growth in the scale of services leads to a
decline in industry and a rise in services.
∗We have beneﬁted from helpful comments from Gary Becker, Patrick Kehoe, Virgiliu
Midrigan, Ellen McGrattan, Enrique Martinez-Garcia, Joel Mokyr, Chiaki Moriguchi, Ed
Prescott, Richard Rogerson and participants in presentations at the AEA 2007 meetings,
Northwestern University, the FRB of Chicago, the FRB of Minneapolis, the NBER Summer
Institure, the University of Wisconsin, and the University of Chicago.
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1The rise of large scale technologies is a central aspect of the process of
development. Industrialization involves the implementation of technologies with
high and rapidly growing productivity. These technologies are not only more
productive but also involve a dramatic increase in the optimal scale of productive
units. For example, in the United States, the workers per manufacturing ﬁrm
increased seven fold between 1850 to 1950, from nine to sixty-three workers.
During the same period, real income per capita had risen only ﬁve-fold.1
The emergence of scale technologies is a central theme in the modern litera-
ture on industrialization.2 This literature, in examining the potential obstacles
to development stemming from scale technologies, has focused on the transition
from traditional, small-scale, cottage industry technologies to large-scale man-
ufacturing during development. The sole emphasis on the rise of the manufac-
turing sector ignores a broader set of changes taking place during the transition
to a modern economy. Indeed, at its peak, industry constitutes less than half of
an economy’s measured output. A broader view of the process of development,
dating back to Kuznets (1973), includes the changes in the relative importance
of broadly deﬁned sectors, (e.g.,agriculture, manufacturing and services), the
marketization of home production, and the introduction of modern technologies
into the household.
In this paper, we document facts on scale patterns, sectoral trends, and
home vs. market decisions, and provide a uniﬁed theory for them. In our the-
ory, scale technologies are the origin of structural change. That is, a model
designed to be consistent with cross-sectoral and secular evidence on the scale
of productive units delivers strong predictions for the movement of production
between sectors and between home and the market. These predictions are con-
sistent with the data. In particular, large-scale technologies drive production
out of the home and into the market, but these patterns reverse when house-
holds begin directly purchasing productive intermediates en masse,a n dm u c h
modern service production moves back into the home. This drives an expansion
of the manufacturing sector at the expense of agriculture and services. Finally,
large-scale technologies may play a role in the more recent counter-reversal, in
which home production has declined relative to market labor and services.
We model the role of scale in a dynamic economy with two technologies, a
high-growth, modern technology and a stagnant, traditional, subsistence tech-
nology. The modern is a multi-stage technology with product units of three
diﬀerent scales: home production, services, and manufacturing. The optimal
scales of these units arise because of specialized and indivisible manufactured
(intermediate/capital) goods needed for modern production.
• Home production using the modern technology involves production only
for (very customized) self-consumption. It is therefore the smallest scale
1The historical importance of the growth in scale has been well-documented, e.g., Atack,
1985, Broadberry, 2006, Chandler, 1990, Goldin and Katz, 1995, Mokyr, 2001, and Sokoloﬀ,
1984, There is also empirical work on currently less developed countries, e.g., Banerjee and
Duﬂo, 2005, and Buera, Kaboski, and Shin, 2007.
2See, for example, important contributions by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989a, 1989b),
Matsuyama (1992), and Banerjee and Newman (1993).
2and most costly to produce, but its output is customized and therefore
has utility beneﬁts.
• Services production is a substitute for home production. It has an in-
termediate optimal scale, and its productive eﬃciencies may or may not
outweigh its lower utility from limited customization.
• Manufacturing requires the largest ﬁxed intermediates/capital and there-
fore operates at the largest scale. Given the large ﬁxed costs and eﬃcient
scale in manufacturing, home production of manufactured goods is not a
revelant alternative.
In contrast to the modern technologies, traditional production requires no
intermediate/capital goods and oﬀers no advantages of scale. Hence all produc-
tion occurs in the home.
On the consumption side, agents hold a continuum of satiable wants ordered
by the cost of producing output to satisfy them. Wants are symmetric. That
is, although there is a diﬀerence in utility between home and market produced
output, all wants are subject to this choice and so oﬀer the same potential utility
The model identiﬁes two forces at work that determine the relative growth of
the manufacturing, service, and home production over the development process.
The ﬁrst force (“marketization”) leads to a relative increase in both industry
and market services at the expense of the traditional home technology. The
modern technology experiences technological progress, which the home is not
able to fully replicate because of its necessary small-scale of operation. It is
the large-scale of production of new technologies that draws production out of
the home and into the market place. These modern scale technologies involve
both industry and services, however, and this marketization force leads to an
expansion of both, and a decline in traditional home production. This force
is most important early in industrialization, when traditional home production
is prevalent, and marketization is strongest for technologies with large optimal
scales, high ﬁxed intermediate/capital costs, and low utilization rates in the
home (e.g. railroad production and rail travel).
The second force (“mass consumption”) further drives the growth of man-
ufacturing, but involves the choice to operate the modern technology at home
rather than purchase market services. We call this force “mass consumption”
because the choice of modern home production requires that consumers directly
purchase manufacturing inputs, and generally requires more manufacturing in-
puts per unit of output (e.g. commuting separately in cars rather than riding
otgether in a bus). Relative to modern market production of services, mod-
ern home production therefore yields less market production of services, but
requires more manufactured goods production. Mass consumption often occurs
later than marketization, as the costs of intermediates fall relative to income,
but may occur immediately if disutility of market consumption is high, utiliza-
tion is high, or the cost of intermediate goods are small (e.g., food and clothing
services).
3With suﬃcient heterogeneity in scale or the size of intermediate goods re-
quirements, the model yields rich product cycles between the home and market.
The production of goods is large scale and has a single transition from home to
the market. Services for which scale is intermediate (e.g., local transportation,
laundering) may move from the home (traditional) to the market, and back to
the home (modern) over the course of development, while the smallest scale ser-
vices may simply transition from traditional home to modern home production
(e.g. cooking with a wood-burning stove to cooking with a gas/electric range).
Our emphasis on the link between scale technologies, sectoral allocations,
and the home production margin is consistent with several additional empirical
facts. First, the increase (and peak) in manufacturing’s share in value-added
coincides with an increase (and peak) in the share of non-food goods in con-
sumption, which is consistent with the mass consumption force. Second, the
peak in manufacturing in the U.S. also corresponds to a peak in the amount of
time spent in home production (Ramey and Francis, 2007). Market labor sup-
ply is known to be U-shaped over development (Goldin, 1994, Schultz, 1991),
and the trough in labor supply in the U.S. also corresponds to the peak in home
production. Finally, the post-1950 decline in industry relative to services is as-
sociated with growth in the scale of services, a decline in home production, and
an increase in labor supply.
We conclude the introduction by reviewing related literature, in order to de-
lineate our relative contribution, and underscore that our emphasis on scale and
a broader view of structural change is important for policy and measurement.
After this literature review, Section 2 develops the broad facts of structural
change that motivate the paper. Section 3 introduces the model while Section 4
presents the main results. Section 5 discusses two extension of the basic model:
(i) the case with heterogeneity in the scale of services; and (ii) a model with
explicit durability of intermediate manufacturing inputs (capital). Section 6
compares some testable implications of our model with the data, and Section 7
concludes.
Related Literature Our empirical work extends and complements that of
Kuznets (1957), Chenery and Syrquin, (1975), and Kravis et. al, (1984) by using
updated sources and broadening the data in terms of number of countries and
panel length. We use broadly comparable sources, and use our theory to make
classiﬁcation decisions for areas where discrepancies hold across methodologies.
Indeed, our theory of scale as a sectoral distinction gives guidance to empiri-
cal work, which has debated how to best classify handicrafts/cottage industries,
which are particularly prevalent in less developed countries.3 Given their small-
scale, we classify them as services. In our view, the scale of a productive unit
3Dean and Cole (1967, pp. 138-139) describe the problems of classiﬁcation that arose
from the “radical transformation” of the structure of the British economy. Many occupations
were classiﬁed in “retail trade and handicraft” in the 1831 census (e.g., wood and furniture,
shipbuilding, printing, fur and leather, dressmaking, watches, toys and musical instruments,
food/drink and also iron founders, weavers, dyers, and paper) were classiﬁed as manufacturing
in later censuses.
4reﬂects the extent of customization, with manufactured goods oﬀering the least,
home production oﬀering the most, and services being intermediate. In this
way, our paper is related to the view of Reid (1935) that manufacturing pro-
duces objects while services produce “circumstance” (location, condition, etc.),
and Locay’s (1990) view that more customized activities are produced in the
household.4
An existing theoretical literature (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989a,
1989b, Matsuyama, 1992, and Banerjee and Newman, 1993) has examined the
role of scale in development, but in a diﬀerent context. They showed how ﬁxed
costs involved with large scale technologies can lead to poverty traps in the
presence of frictions, but focused on a single modern sector. In our broader
view, where scale diﬀers across sectors, frictions can have diﬀerential impacts
across sectors as in Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2007), Erosa and Hidalgo (2007),
or Rajan and Zingales (1998).5 Diﬀerential eﬀects on services and industry can
be important since the sectors diﬀer in their tradability and their contribution
to investment.
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989b) and Matsuyama (2002) also demon-
strate the importance of mass consumer demand of manufactured goods in de-
velopment. Katona (1964) emphasizes household investment in durables an im-
portant characteristic of “mass consumption”, however, and we draw a unique
link between these durables and the growth of household production and manu-
facturing relative to services. Lagakos (2007) studies retailing and automobiles,
a particular example of this link. Given the role of scale, frictions in consumer
credit markets and the distribution of income may also play a role in industri-
alization.
Our model also underscores the measurement problems of home production
and home labor, and so is related to recent work on the growth of the service
sector and labor supply (Ngai and Pissarides, 2007, Rogerson, 2007). This ap-
proach diverges the recent literature on balanced growth and structural change
(e.g., Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2007, Ngai and Pissarides, 2007, and Kongsamut,
Rebelo, and Xie, 2001, Foellmi and Zweimueller, 2006). Instead, we model a
transition from stagnation to modern growth as in Galor (2005), Galor and Weil
(2000), Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2007), and Hansen and Prescott (2005).
4Statistical agencies uses various categories to group industries according to their type of
products. For example, according to the NIPA "goods are tangible products that can be stored
or inventoried, services are products that cannot be stored and are consumed at the place and
time of their purchase." Within goods, manucturing establishments are deﬁned, according
to the NAICS, as those "engaged in the mechanical, physical, or chemical transformation
of materials, substances, or components into new products." Such deﬁnitions are problematic
practically (many classiﬁcations do not adhere to the deﬁnition) and conceptually (distinctions
are not economically meaningful).
5The scale-dependent policies as emphasized by Guner, Ventura, and Yi (2006) can also
aﬀect sectors diﬀerentially.
51 Facts of Structural Change
“The rate of structural transformation of the economy is high.
Major aspects of structural change include the shift away from agri-
culture to non-agriculture pursuits, and, recently, away from indus-
try to services; a change of the scale of productive units, and a
related shift from personal enterprise to impersonal organization of
economic ﬁrms, with a corresponding change in the occupational
status of labor.” (Kuznets, 1971, 2)
This section documents key facts on three aspects of structural change:
growth in the scale of productive establishments, sectoral reallocations of pro-
duction, and rich dynamics between home and market production.
1.1 Large Scale Technologies
In the model of the next section, scale is a proxy for the cost diﬀerential between
home-scale and market-scale production. In the data, we will focus on workers
per establishment as our preferred metric of scale in the market.6 Workers per
enterprise is another alternative, but ﬁrms are often driven by contracting rather
than technological considerations.7 The facts we present hold for either metric,
however.
The ﬁrst fact is that the growth process involves the introduction of large
scale technologies in both industry and services. The industrial revolution in-
volved the gradual spread of the factory system, characterized by the staggered
arrival of a series of large-scale technologies (Mokyr, 2001, Scranton, 1997).
Advances in agriculture in the early 18th century (e.g., seed drills, iron plows,
threshing machines, and most importantly, enclosures) were a precursor, but the
industrial revolution took oﬀ as technologies such as textile milling, iron produc-
tion, mining, and steam power became increasingly economically viable.8 All led
to increases in the scale of production, and required large capital investments.
Similarly, the technologies of the second industrial revolution in the late 19th
and early 20th century, such as steel, concrete, paper and chemicals, internal
combustion engines, electricity, and food processing, led to even larger scales
of eﬃcient production, as did increased mechanization in agriculture (tractors,
harvesters, etc.).9
6In the model, output or capital would be related measures.
7In some cases, however, the ﬁrm is the appropriate level that a technology is operated
(e.g., Walmart and inventory management).
8Textiles provide an example of the staggered arrival of technologies, which took over a
century to fully move to large scale production. As Mokyr (2001) describes, cotton spinning,
carding, bleaching, and printing were mechanized relatively early and moved to factory pro-
duction, while weaving production remained in the home until the power looms arrival in the
1820s. Combed wool spinning was mechanized early, but the combing process itself was not
mechanized until the mid-19th century. Hand production of worsted wool and linen lasted
even longer.
9Berg (1994) provides an excellent description of the early development of the factory
system. Mokyr (1990) and Chandler (1990) give detailed accounts of technological innovations
6The 19th century U.S. censuses of manufacturing made available by Atack
and Bateman (1999) support the narrative history.10 Most manufacturers were
still small-scale, with the median establishment employing just three workers
in 1850, but the larger means indicate some larger scale producers in 1850.
Scale grew in most industries between 1850 and 1870. The scales of industries
associated with the new technologies (steel, textiles, paper, engines, farming
machinery) were an order of magnitude larger, and had the largest increases in
scale from 1850 to 1870. Appendix A presents these data from the 1850 and
1870 census of manufacturers for the major industries that can be compared
over time.
Scale technologies were not particular only to goods production, but required
services in their delivery (Chandler, 1990). Services, transportation, retail trade,
and wholesale trade, in particular, were important elements even in early in-
dustrialization (Mokyr, 1990, Chandler, 1990). Canals, steam power, adding
machines and cash registers, and other new oﬃce technologies led to an increase
in the scale of services (Broadberry, 2006).
The second fact is that although modern services involved scale technologies,
manufacturing technologies operate on a much larger scale. Even in the census of
manufacturers, the smallest scale industries are those most commonly associated
with services (dairy, bakeries, crop services, repair shops). For example, there
was a large increase in the scale of meat products from 1850 to 1870 that may
reﬂect a transformation of this industry from butchers to meat packers.11
The histograms of establishment size in Figure 1 show more generally that
services are overwhelmingly small scale relative to industry. The vertical bar
indicates the average scales of 47 and 14 for 4-digit (SIC) manufacturing and
services, respectively. Despite the wide variance of scale in industry, the distri-
butions overlap very little with most of the mass in services being below ten,
and most of the mass of manufacturers being greater than ten. The diﬀerence is
scale is true across each broad industry in the goods sector (including agricul-
ture, mining, utilities, and manufacturing) and services sectors (transportation,
services, public administration) with the exception of construction, which is typ-
ically in the industrial sector, but has many service-like characteristics.12 The
identical patterns hold for enterprise size rather than establishment size with
average scales of 57 and 18, respectively.
in the second industrial revolution and how they lead to large scale production .
10Atack (1985) provides further evidence for the U.S., while Sokoloﬀ (1984) and Sicsic
(1994) provide evidence for early 19th century northeastern U.S. and 19th century France,
respectively.
11At times, scale has been used as an explicit basis for classiﬁcation. For example, in
the 1927 census, producers of confectionaries, ice cream and sheet iron were deemed to be
manufacturers (as opposed to services) if annual production was at least $20,000.
12For example, construction is non-tradable, and much of construction consists of small-scale
contract work for which home production is a viable alternative.













Figure 1: Histogram of Average Size per Establishment (4-digit SIC), US 1997
1.2 Sectoral Reallocations
We extend Kuznets’ stylized development patterns for reallocations across in-
dustry, services and manufacturing with longer time series and a wider set of
countries. Utilizing recent independent work by economic historians, we have
assembled reliable extended time series of current price value-added share data
for 30 countries, covering six continents and diﬀerent levels of current develop-
ment. (See documentation and data at
http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~fjb913/BK2_DataAppendix.zip for de-
tails.)13
The data series are summarized Figure ??, which shows value-added shares
vs. real income per capita for industry (top panel), services (middle panel), and
agriculture (bottom panel). Beyond the well-known decline in agriculture in the
lower panel, two important features are discernible.
First, the share of manufacturing is hump shaped over development. Of
the 30 countries, 21 — including all high income countries — have experienced an
i n c r e a s ea n dt h e nd e c l i n ei ni n d u s t r y ,w h ile the remaining lower income countries
13These countries include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,
Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Nether-
lands, Norway, Pakistan/Bangladesh, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, United States, Taiwan and Thailand. Based on Maddison (2005), our data
covers: 68 percent of world population and 80 percent of world GDP in 2000; 70 percent and 74
percent, respectively, in 1950; and 40 percent and 60 percent, respectively in 1900. Although
the numbers are lower for 1900, since the longer time series include Western Europe and its
oﬀshoots, we cover a much larger share of the population and economic activity undergoing
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Figure 2: Sectoral Shares vs. Log Income per Capita for Country Panels
9have only (yet) experienced the increase in industry. For these 21 countries,
the peak share averages 0.40 (std. dev: 0.05) and occurs at an average per
capita income of $7100 (st. dev.: $1800). Using this $7100 threshold to divide
the country-year observations in the sample, regressions of industry’s share of
country j on its log real income per capita (lnyj)that include country-speciﬁc
ﬁxed-eﬀects (αj) yields the following results (standard errors in parentheses):
< $7100 sample: Ind. Sharej = αj +0 .11
(0.00)
lnyj
≥ $7100 sample: Ind. Sharej = αj − 0.13
(0.01)
lnyj
Second, services constitute a substantial share of output even early on, but
exhibit a late acceleration with the decline of manufacturing. The 25 countries
for which we have data at levels of per capita income below $2000 have services
shares averaging 0.39 (std. dev: 0.07), which is comparable to the average share
of agriculture in that income level, 0.40. The analogous split sample regression
using service shares demonstrates the late acceleration:14
< $7100 sample: Serv. Sharej = αj +0 .07
(0.01)
lnyj
≥ $7100 sample: Serv. Sharej = αj +0 .20
(0.01)
lnyj
1.3 Rich Dynamics Home vs. Market Movements
The location of particular productive activities changes markedly over develop-
ment, and many activities exhibit rich product cycles. Historically, and even
today in less developed economies, it has been diﬃcult to construct truly mean-
ingful national accounts, since they typically only encompass market activities.15
In these less developed economies, the advent and spread of industrialization
involves the marketization of many formerly home-produced activities, As doc-
umented by Reid (1935), these included “spinning, weaving, sewing, tailoring,
baking, butchering, soap-making, candle-making, brewing, preserving, launder-
ing, dyeing, gardening, care of poultry,...,child care, education, and the care of
the sick” (p. 47).16
Two important industries that Reid omits are transportation and trade,
both of which became much less home produced over time. Canals, railroads,
and, later, mass transportation gradually replaced walking and horse-driven
14The UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, which includes sector speciﬁc
numbers for a much larger cross-section of 161 countries but over a shorter time period (1970-
2000), yields very similar results with low- and high-income sample coeﬃcients of 0.07 and
-0.12 for industry, respectively, and 0.04 and 0.18 for services.
15Owner-occupied housing services and self-consumed agricultural output, particularly im-
portant in poorer, agrarian economies, are often imputed into national accounts, but home
production of most other goods and services are not.
16Reid’s observation was for the United States. Deane and Cole (1967) describe production
in pre-industrial Britain, where market transactions were more prevalent, but small-scale
production in the home still dominated. Even as industrialization increased market production
of textiles, many productive activities were still contracted or "put out" to households.
10transportation. Similarly, sale of home-produced output at markets became
a smaller and smaller fraction of trade, as permanent retailers developed and
distribution chains expanded.
Eventually, many of these marketized activities, as well as other market ser-
vices, have moved back in the home. Buera and Kaboski (2006) show how many
services declined in the twentieth century as important modern technologies and
goods diﬀused to households. Important product cycles include the decline of
transportation services, such as railroads, rail lines, and buses with the spread of
the private automobile. The automobile was also related to the decline in neigh-
borhood retail services (food, apparel, ice, fuel, dairy, “ﬁve and dime stores”),
as was the spread of refrigerators and freezers.17 Similarly, the spread of wash-
ers, dryers, vacuums, microwaves, and other home appliances (see Greenwood et
al, 2005) was accompanied by declines in domestic servants, launders, and dry
cleaners. Francis and Ramey (2006) cite historical evidence that the spread of
many household appliances were associated with increases in household produc-
tion labor because activities (e.g., bread baking, laundry) moved from market to
home production. Many newer activities that have started in the market have
also moved toward home production. Examples include the relative decline of
movie theaters (spread of televisions, VCRs, and DVD players), mail services
(computers, fax machines), and recently internet cafes (computers, cable inter-
net connections).
These examples of demarketization are quantitatively important. Together,
Buera and Kaboski (2006) show that 75 percent of all declining service industries
between 1950 to 2000 are associated with identiﬁable movements toward home
production.
1.4 Summary
We have established 3 important facts:
Fact 1 The industrial revolution involves large scale technologies, but the scale
of manufacturing greatly exceeds that of services.
Fact 2 Both modern industry and services play an important role early in
development, but industry follows an extended hump-shape, while services
exhibits a late acceleration.
Fact 3 Economies experience rich product cycles between home and market
production, including marketization and later demarketization of many
services.
In the next section we present a model consistent with Fact 1, which in
turn yields Facts 2 and 3.
17Lagakos (2006) examines the relationship between automobiles, retailing consolidation,
and productivity in the context of developing countries.
112 A Theory of Structural Change
We model the consumption decision over a continuum of discrete wants. Indi-
viduals also choose whether to home produce or to procure these wants from the
market. Production can be done using a traditional or a modern technology.
Production using the modern technology requires the use of ﬁxed amount of
intermediate manufactured goods in combination with labor to produce up to
a maximum scale. To satiate each want requires the use of both manufactured
goods and services. In the model economy, as in the data, manufacturing diﬀers
from services by requiring a larger ﬁxed cost and operating at a larger scale.
2.1 Preferences
There is a continuum of consumption wants indexed by z.F o r e a c h w a n t z,
households make a discrete decision of whether to consume c(z) as e r v i c es a t -
isfying the want, and, if so, whether or not to home produce h(z) the service.




[h(z)+γ (1 − h(z))]c(z)dz (1)
where h(z) ≤ c(z) ∈ {0,1}. As will be clear with the discussion of technologies,
z indexes the complexity associated with the production of a want.18
Since γ ∈ (0,1), home production yields more utility, perhaps because it
avoids the disutility of public consumption (e.g., sitting next to others on the
bus instead of driving one’s own car), or because it allows an individual to
customize ﬁnal consumption to his particular needs (e.g., driving one’s own car
allows to use the preferred scheduled and route).19
2.2 Technologies
Individual wants can be produced using a traditional or a modern (scale) tech-
nology. The traditional technology requires only labor as an input and expe-
riences no productivity growth. The modern technology uses both labor and
a ﬁxed input of intermediate manufactured inputs to produce up to a maxi-
mum scale. Overtime, the productivity associated with the modern technology
increases at a constant rate g.
18These preferences over a continuum of satiable wants are related to Matsuyama (2000,
2002) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). On the preference side, our innovation is to
incorporate the home-production decision as in Kaboski and Buera (2007).
19An alternative way to motivate home-production is to introduce transaction cost. See
Buera and Kaboski (2006) from a discussion of the implication of this alternative model.
122.2.1 Traditional Technology
Individual wants can be produced using a traditional technology that requires
only labor as an input and experiences no productivity growth:
y0(z)=z−1l
Labor productivity declines with the index of wants z, so that high z goods
and services are more complex, and therefore more diﬃcult to produce. The tra-
ditional technology does not require manufactured inputs, and therefore exhibits
no scale economies. Therefore, all production using the traditional technology
is done at home.
2.2.2 Modern (Scale) Technology
We also consider a modern production technology that requires a ﬁxed input and
is characterized by an eﬃcient scale of production. In particular, production of
goods and services associated with a want z requires a specialized intermediate
manufactured input (k)o fs i z eq. Given the intermediate input, the technology








if k = q (2)
Furthermore, λ<1, i.e., the modern technology is relatively more pro-
ductive than the traditional technology for more complex goods. The modern
technology becomes relatively more attractive over time because technological
change increases productivity at a rate g, and consumption moves towards more
complex wants.
Here n represents both the capacity and the eﬃcient scale. For example, if
ap a r t i c u l a rz were laundry, a service, then q might represent the cost of the
laundry machine, which enables one to wash n loads of laundry when used at
capacity.
At home, individuals will produce only one unit of output, and therefore
underutilize purchased intermediates, i.e., produce at a higher cost scale. For
this implication, it is important that the intermediates are indivisible (one can-
not be half as productive with half a laundry machine) and specialized (a car
cannot substitute for a laundry machine in doing laundry).
2.2.3 Distinguishing Sectors
The ﬁrst distinction we make between sectors is to assume that goods production
has a much larger eﬃcient scale than services production. This is consistent with
the evidence presented in Section 2.
As we show in the following section, production requiring large intermediate
inputs q and/or done on a large scale n will tend to be performed on the market.
For simplicity we model the extreme limiting case as qM →∞ , so that manu-
factures are exclusively market produced. A further assumption of nM →∞ ,
13and qM/nM → 0 bounds the cost of goods. Thus, manufacturing production in
the market simpliﬁes to a constant return to scale technology:20
yM (z,t)=egtz−λlM
In what follows, to save on notation, we use q and n to refer to the interme-
diate input requirement and maximum scale associated with the production of
services.
Secondly, we also make the further simpliﬁcation that goods are only inter-
mediates and not valued directly in the utility function. Goods will nevertheless
be purchased as ﬁnal consumption to be used in household production of ser-
vices. Including goods as direct ﬁnal consumption is feasible, but complicates
the analysis without yielding much insight. Thus, for every z there is an inter-
mediate good and a ﬁnal service.21
Finally, within the goods sector we distinguish agriculture as being the least
complex goods, those below an arbitrary level zA.
The assumption that goods production is large scale makes it market rather
than home produced.
2.3 Equilibrium
We can now state the household’s problem and the competitive equilibrium.
For each want z, the household makes three linked binary decisions: whether to
consume or not, c(z), if so whether to home produce or not, h(z), and again if
so, whether to use the modern technology in home production, m(z).
Normalizing labor as the numeraire, the household takes the wage and the
prices of each good pM(z) and service pS(z) as given, and solves the following
20Alternatively, we can assume that
qM
nM → α, a constant that equals the intermediate goods’
s h a r ei nm a n u f a c t u r i n g .I nt h i sc a s e ,m a n u f a c t u r i n gp r o d u c t i o ni nt h em a r k e ts i m p l i ﬁes to a
constant return to scale technology with ﬁxed factor proportions:
ym (z,t)=eγt−λz min{(1 − α)lm,αk m}.
21Furthermore, it can be argued that these two distinctions between goods and services
are intimately related, as ﬁnal consumption tends to be more customized and therefore less
subject to large scale production (Locay, 1990).






































The left-hand side of the budget constraint is total market expenditures,
while the right-hand side is income/labor supply.
The ﬁrst-order condition of whether to home produce or market purchase a
particular service z yields the central intuition for the model. A particular want









> 1 − γ (4)
The bracketed term represents the cost-savings of market production. Both
market and home production use labor (valued at the opportunity cost of time
w =1 ), but the market service requires paying only a fraction (1/n) of the
intermediate goods cost, as opposed to the full goods cost from purchasing
the input. Households will use the market if the utility value of this cost-
savings (left-hand side) exceeds the lost utility from consuming market- rather
than home-produced output (right-hand side). Output that requires large or
expensive intermediates (high q or pM), or has a large eﬃcient scale n will
be home produced. Hence, our assumptions that manufacturing requires large
intermediates inputs q and is done on a large scale n justify the statement that
manufacturing is market produced.23
A competitive equilibrium is given by price functions pM (z,t), pS (z,t),
consumption, home production, and technology decisions c(z,t), h(z,t) and
22The assumption that goods production is large scale makes it market rather than home
produced. This could be seen clearly from the the household’s ﬁrst-order condition of whether










> 1 − γ.
As qm and nm go to inﬁnity, the left-hand-side becomes arbitrarily large.
23Strictly speaking, if manufactured goods are only intermediate goods there will not be a
utility advantage associated with home-production of manufactures. The following heuristic
argument should be understood within generalized model in which there is a utility gain associ-
ated with the home-production of manufactures, e.g., because of the possibility of custumizing
its design.
15m(z,t)(associated with purchases of goods and services by households) such
that:
i. given prices pM (z,t) and pS (z,t), c(z,t), h(z,t) and m(z,t) solve (3);










iii. markets (i.e., for labor, each z good, and each z service) clear.
Next, we characterize the evolution of the structure of production of the
economy. This process includes a shift from traditional technologies to modern
(scale) technologies, changes in the wants that are home vs. market produced,
and a transformation of the sectoral composition of output and employment.
3 Evolution of Structural Change
This section presents the results of the paper, which tie in closely with the
facts presented in Section 2, given our assumption of large scale modern tech-
nologies and the larger relative scale of manufacturing. Proposition 1 describes
the early transition from the pre-industrial to industrial scale economies and
the marketization of previously home production activities, while Proposition
2 describes the later phase of industrialization in which activities return to the
home as households begin mass consumption of modern technology intermedi-
ates. Thus, together the two propositions lead to rich product cycles, and a
growth in manufacturing relative to services. Finally, Proposition 3 shows how
the share of the service sector is increasing in its eﬃcient scale of production.
3.1 Early Structural Transformation
For suﬃciently low values of t, only the traditional technology is utilized. Since
production using the traditional technology requires no specialized inputs, all
production is done at home. Households consume the low z goods ﬁrst, since all
z are valued symetrically, but the least complex output is cheapest to produce.
An upper bound z0 (t) deﬁnes the range of goods that are produced using the
traditional technology. Early on, z0 (t) also equals the most complex want that
is satiated ¯ z (t). This upper bound remains ﬁxed until industrialization.24
As productivity improves, the modern technology eventually becomes eco-
nomically viable. The frontier z(= z0) is the ﬁrst to be replaced by the modern
24This meshes with the historical evidence of the pre-industrial economy: relatively stag-
nant, with a very high fraction of production done at a small scale and at home (Reid, 1935,
Deane and Cole, 1967, Mokyr, 1990, 2001).
16technology, but over time the modern technology becomes more productive for
even the less complex output. During this period, the upper range of consump-
tion z (t) increases, and the upper range of consumption produced using the old
technology z0 (t) declines. In particular, there exists a point in time at which the
modern technology overtakes the traditional technology for the most complex

















The timing of the onset of industralization in the model depends positively
on the share of intermediate specialized inputs in the modern technologies, q/n,
and negatively on the rate of productivity growth in the modern technology and
the disutility associated with market consumption.25
The rise of scale technologies is associated with an increase in ¯ z (t) i.e., an
expansion of the wants that are satiated, and a decrease in z0 (t) (a decline
of the range of wants satisﬁed through the traditional technology). Figure 3
illustrates this process. It describe the average cost per util as a function of the
complexity of wants for the traditional (dotted) and modern (solid) technologies.
Over time, the average cost per util for the modern technology declines.
Whether the new modern production that was previously traditional occurs
as market or home production depends on the eﬃcient scale of services relative
to the utility advantage of home-production. If the scale of services is suﬃciently
small relative to the utility advantage of home-production, 1+q/n > γ(1 + q),
the advent of the modern technology is associated with a rise in the consumption
of intermediate manufactured goods by households to be used as input in the
home production of services. For these wants, services remain home produced,
and there is just a transition from a traditional to a modern technology that
utilizes intermediate inputs produced with a large scale technology. In the case
of wants for which the scale of service production is large relative to the utility
advantage of home-production, 1+q/n < γ(1 + q), service production using
the modern technology occurs on the market. In section 5, we generalize the
model to allow for heterogeneity in the scale of services.
We summarize the previous discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Industrialization): There exist two critical periods t0 and
t1, t0 <t 1, such that:
i) for t<t 0, only the traditional technology is utilized, the set of wants that are
satiated remains ﬁxed, and all production is done at home, i.e., z0 (t)=z (t)=
¯ z (t)=0 ;
ii) for t0 ≤ t<t 1,
(a) the most complex wants are produced using the modern technology, z0 (t) ≤
z ≤ ¯ z (t), the set of satiated wants expands, ∂¯ z (t)/∂t > 0, the set of wants pro-
duced using the traditional technology contracts, ∂z0 (t)/∂t < 0;a n d
25In modelling the onset of the industrial revolution as the moment in which a modern
technology overcomes a traditional technology we follow Hansen and Prescott (2002). See
also Stokey (2001).
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Figure 3: Average Cost per Util as a Function of Complexity (z): Traditional




1+q < (>)γ, the most complex wants are satisﬁed in the market (at
home) using the modern technology, and the service and industrial sectors (only
the industrial sector) grow relative to agriculture.
3.2 The Rise of Mass-Consumption
Eventually the goods cost of producing any particular service z fall enough to
induce direct household purchase of the market good and the home production
of this service. Services begin returning to home production, but this time using
the modern technology. This leads to the mass consumption of manufactured
goods that are used in the production of services, and therefore is associated
with sectoral reallocations in output: the return of market production to the
home increases the demand for the given market good (by a factor of n), and
decreases the purchase of the related service. Thus, the manufacturing sector
experiences a boom relative to the service sector, and this contributes to the
rising section of the hump-shaped manufacturing trend found in the data.
Proposition 2 (Mass Consumption): Assume (1 + q/n)/(1 + q) <γ.T h e n ,
there exist t1> t0 such that for t ≥ t1, the most complex home-produced wants
are produced using the modern technology, z0(t) < z ≤ z(t) < ¯ z(t),t h es e to f
wants satiated expands, ∂¯ z (t)/∂t > 0, the set of home-produced wants using the
18modern technology expands, ∂z(t)/∂t > 0 and ∂z0(t)/∂t < 0; and the indus-
trial sector grows relative to the service sector.
Proposition 2 links a surge in the share of manufacturing to a surge in the
share of manufactured goods in household consumption. We return to this
testable implication in Section 4.
3.3 Large Scale Services and the Decline of Manufacturing
The previous sections have developed the model’s ability to deliver a long ex-
tended rise of industry. This section focuses on the model’s implications for the
later decline in manufacturing, and corresponding rise in services.26
The model predicts that the larger the scale of services, the larger the rel-
ative size of the services sector. There are two intuitive reasons for this result.
First, the larger the scale, the less the goods cost per unit. That is, keeping
q constant, the share of intermediate goods is decreasing in scale. Second, the
larger the scale, the larger the cost savings of market production of services
(which produces at this eﬃcient scale) relative to home production. The follow-
ing proposition formalizes this.
Proposition 3: Both the share of market services (relative to market goods)
and the ratio of market labor to home labor are increasing in the the scale of
services, n.
In Section 4, we use the recent growth in the scale of services in the U.S. to
test this implication of the theory.
4 Testable Implications
This section examines evidence on two testable implications of the theory: (1)
evidence on the importance of the rise of mass consumption (Proposition 2), and
(2) evidence on the link between the scale of market services and their share
(Proposition 3).
4.1 Evidence on Mass Consumption
Proposition 2 predicts a link between the growth of household consumption of
manufactured goods and the growing importance of the industrial sector relative
to the service sector. It also links this consumption with the movement of
activities into home production. Figure 4 shows that patterns in the value-added
of industry and services are tied closely to household consumption of non-food
26Buera and Kaboski (2006) focus on a related, and complementary explanation for the




























Figure 4: U.S. Nominal Sectoral Share, 1870-2000
goods and services, respectively.27 Indeed, the peak of the share of the industrial
sector coincides with peaks in the share of consumption expenditures on non-
food goods. The peak in the fraction of non-leisure time spent in household
production also coincides with these other two peaks. More generally, a U-shape
in market labor supply over development is well-established and driven by the
market hours of women (Goldin, 1994, and Schultz, 1991), which presumably
reﬂects time reallocation between market and non-market production.
4.1.1 Scale and the Growth of Services
The model also has relevance for the decline of industry and corresponding
growth of services. Proposition 3 links the share of services to the optimal
scale of market service production n. Data from the County Business Patterns
show a steady increase of 70 percent in the average scale of services from 1947-
1997, while the scale in the goods sector has actually declined.28 Moreover,
at a disaggregate level the growth in the service sector has been dominated
by services whose scale has grown, and who are now among the largest scale
27The consumption data is from Lebergott (1996) and NIPA, while the fraction of non-
leisure time spent on household production are from Ramey and Francis for the population
aged 18-65.
28Scale is again deﬁn e da sw o r k e r sp e re s t a b l i s h m e n to rw o r k e r sp e rﬁrm. In 1974, there
is a change from a "reporting unit" (ﬁrm) concept to establishment. The pre- and post-1974
changes are 59 and 17 percent, respectively.
20services. Using scale and payroll information by 3-digit level from the 1959 and
1997 County Business Patterns, OLS regressions yield the following estimates






where i represents 3-digit SIC industry (based on IPUMS 1950 coding, which
allows us to link it to IPUMS data on schooling levels of workers in each in-
dustry), ∆sharei is the absolute change in the percentage share of industry
in total payroll payments between 1959 and 1997. The positive coeﬃcient on
∆logscalei, the change in log employees per establishment, is signiﬁcant at the
one percent level. That is, industries that have grown in share have been the
industries whose scale has increased.
This result is robust in two important ways. First, excluding the ﬁve largest
and ﬁve smallest changes in shares still yields an estimate that is positive and
still signiﬁcant at a ﬁve percent level. Second, the relationship is not simply
capturing the relationship between growth and skill intensity observed in Buera
and Kaboski (2007). Controlling for skilli, the fraction of labor in an industry








The coeﬃcient on ∆logscalei is nearly identical and still signiﬁcant at a one
percent level. Thus, growth in scale appears to be independently related to the
growth of disaggregate services.
4.2 Summary
We have presented theory and evidence of three phases of growth that include:
(1) an early introduction of scale technologies leading to industrialization and
a relative decline in the importance of agricultural output; (2) a somewhat
later expansion of industry associated with mass consumption, and (3) still
later expansion of services with the growth in their scale (which we develop in
Section 4). Figure 5 illustrates these three phases of structural change in the
model economy.
5E x t e n s i o n s
5.1 Heterogeneity in the Scale of Services
So far, we have only considered two dimensions of heterogeneity: in the com-
plexity of wants (z) ,a n di nt h ed i ﬀerence in ﬁxed costs (q)a n ds c a l e( n)o fg o o d s
vs. services. Presumably, there is ample heterogeneity in the scale technology
29Using the fraction that was college-educated in 2000 yields similar results for the role of
scale, though the coeﬃcient on skill is somewhat smaller given the higher education levels.
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Figure 5: Evolution of Structural Change in the Model Economy
even within services. On one side of the spectrum, we ﬁnd clothing services that
requires relatively minor and divisible investments and, with the exception of
specialized clothing items like tuxedos, are seldom provided in the market. On
the other side are long distance travel services which require huge and lumpy
investments and, at least initially, tend to be provided in the market. In this
section we consider a simple extension of the basic model that incorporates this
diversity.
As before, we assume a continuum of wants indexed by their complexity
z ∈ [0,+∞), each want requiring the production of manufactured inputs to be
used with labor to produced the ﬁnal service. In this extension, however, we
allow for multiple wants of a given complexity z with diﬀerent technologies to
produce ﬁnal services. To simplify the analysis, we consider two types of wants
diﬀering in the size of required specialized manufacturing inputs , i.e., i =1 ,2,















In this simple extension, the evolution of the economy is divided in four
stages characterized by three critical dates: t01, t02 and t1.I n t h e ﬁrst sub-
period, all production is done using the traditional technology. This ﬁrst stage,
t ∈ (−∞,t 01), mimics the traditional economy in the model described in the





2 (1 + q1)
i
.
30It is straightforward to generalize this model to the case of a continuum of wants of a
given complexity z, each of these wants indexed by the size of the ﬁxed cost to provide the
ﬁnal service q ∈ [0,∞). In this model, there would be eﬀectively two types of wants: i) those
that are industrialized without the marketization of services, q ≤
(1/γ−1)
1−1/(γn) (> 0 provided




22The second stage, t ∈ [t01,t 02), starts when it becomes proﬁtable to use the
modern technology for type 1 (small manufactured input requirement). In this







, households directly purchase the intermediate
manufactured inputs and home produce the ﬁnal services themselves. Thus, this
stage is characterized by a rise of manufacturing production and consumption
relative to both agriculture/basic wants and services. The provision of clothing
services is an example of such a want.
The third stage, t ∈ [t02,t 1), is initiated when it becomes proﬁtable to also
use the modern technology for type 2 wants. Given their large manufactured







, type 2 services these are initially market
produced. In this stage, both manufacturing and (market) services production
and consumption rises relative to agriculture/basic wants. The provision of
long distance transportation services with steam-engine locomotives are a clear
example of these services.
The last stage is given by transition to home production of these type 2
services. This stage corresponds to the rise of mass consumption described in
the model studied in the previous section, and is also characterized by rise in
manufacturing production and consumption relative to both agriculture/basic
wants and modern services.
This extention highlights another force leading to a rise of manufacturing
production and consumption relative to both traditional sectors and modern
services: the early modernization of wants that are characterized by relatively
small scale technologies to provide the ﬁnal service. As it was the case with the
rise of mass consumption that we discuss in the previous section, the diﬀerence
in the scale of production between home and market production of services, and
among diﬀerent market services, is at the center of the process of structural
change.
5.2 Explicit Durability/Capital
In this section, we extend the basic model to allow for the durability of inter-
mediate manufactured (capital) inputs. This is more in line with much of the
earlier motivation which involves home durables and market capital goods. It
also shows how the model maps into a more standard dynamic model that has
similarities to the standard neoclassical growth model, but also yields insight
into sectoral allocations.
In particular, we assume that each intermediate input faces one-hoss-shay
depreciation at a constant hazard rate δ. As before, there is a continuum of
wants indexed by z that are provided using labor and capital as inputs. For
simplicity, we only consider the limit case where the modern technology is used
in the production of all wants.
The preferences over the various wants within a period are still represented
by the utility function (1), while the intertemporal preferences are represented
the following time-separable utility function:
23Z ∞
0
e−ρtU (C (t))dt (7)
where C(t)=
R +∞
zA [h(z,t)+γ (1 − h(z,t))]c(z,t)dz and U (.) is a strictly in-
creasing and concave function.
To simplify the exposition, we consider a decentralization in which house-
holds own the durable goods used in home production while the capital used
by the market sector is owned by a competitive holding company. Under this
assumption, the household’s problem simpliﬁes to maximize (7) by choosing the
stock of durable goods used in home-production z (t), the purchases of durable
goods d(t), the most complex want that is purchase in the market ¯ z (t),a n dt h e











where the left-hand side gives the purchases of new bonds, market services and
durable goods and the right-hand side the capital and labor income; and the






−∞ pm (z,t)dz,a sa l lw a n t sw i t hc o m p l e x i t yz<z (t) are
home-produced and therefore qs units of capital is required for production.
Standard optimal control arguments can be used to derive the dynamic sys-
tem implied by the consumer’s problem. In what follows we describe a balanced
growth path of this system.
Provided U (C)=−e−σC
σ , a balanced growth path exists and is characterized
by the following two equations:




pm (z,t)qs (r + g + δ)+
1
A(z,t)
− ps (z,t)=( 1− γ)
ps (¯ z,t)
γ
The ﬁrst condition, the Euler equation, equates the interest rate to the rate
of time preference plus a multiple of the growth rate,
g
λ. The second condition
equates the marginal cost of expanding the set of home-produced goods to the
marginal return. The marginal cost (left-hand side) is given by the sum of the
rental cost, pm (z,t)qs (r + g + δ) and the labor costs, 1
A(z,t), net of the savings
associated with not having to satisﬁed this want in the market, ps (z,t).T h e
marginal return (right-hand side) is proportional to the utility gain of home-
production relative to market consumption of a given want, 1 − γ.T h i s l a s t
24condition determines the (constant) width of the set of services that are provided
by the market, ¯ z (t) − z (t).
The model with durability allows us to study the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
cost of capital on the structural composition of consumption of this economy.
Proposition: The share of services in consumption cs is a decreasing function
of the cost of capital r.
A larger cost of capital, due to a larger discount rate ρ or capital distortions,
leads to a bigger cost advantage of market services that use more “eﬃciently”
the capital input. Interestingly, this result is independent of whether services
are more or less capital intensive than manufactures.31
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has incorporated the eﬃcient scale of productive units into theory of
structural change. In particular, the introduction of large scale technologies, and
the distinction between the scale of production in manufacturing, market ser-
vices, and home produced services, help provide a uniﬁed explanation for broad
trends of structural transformation, including not only scale, but also sectoral
movements, and rich product cycles between home and market production.
We have also presented a potentially important explanatory factor in un-
derstanding the recent growth of the service economy: the increasing scale of
services, and the increasing importance of large scale services. To the extent,
that these large scale technologies may be improperly classiﬁed as services, these
trends have implications for revisiting sectoral deﬁnitions in national income ac-
counts.
Our emphasis on the importance of scale is relevant to the deﬁnition of
the service sector in national accounting classiﬁcation schemes. In particular,
the NAICS system, which was instituted in the 1990s, moved in principle to
a production method concept of industry. Still, it moved many large-scale in-
formation industries such as software publishing, printing, and motion pictures
were classiﬁed into the service sector, while smaller scale activities such as bak-
eries and customized goods production were moved into manufacturing. Such
classiﬁcations based on the content of what is produced rather than the produc-
tion method lead to a less meaningful distinction between the sectors. Perhaps
such classiﬁcations need to be revisited.




(r + δ + g) and αs =
qs








(r + δ + g)
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nm both sectors have the same capital intensity, αs = αm = α.N o t i c e
that constant factor shares across sectors are consistent with manufactures operating at a
larger scale, i.e., both nm À ns and qm À qs.
25A Proof of the Results in the Paper
The various results in the paper follow from the characterization of the house-
hold’s problem. In this appendix we provide a characterization of this problem
and we relate this characterization to the propositions in the paper.
The household chooses the set of wants to home produce using the traditional
technology, z ∈ [0,z 0], the set of wants to home produce using the modern
technology, z ∈ (z0,z], and the set of want to market purchase, z ∈ (z, ¯ z],w h e r e
z0 ≤ z ≤ ¯ z. Thus, households choose thresholds z0, z and ¯ z to maximize
max
0≤z0≤z≤¯ z
(1 − γ)z + γ¯ z



















pM (z,t).T h eﬁrst-order con-
ditions are
γ + θ2 = μpS (¯ z,t) (8)
(1 − γ)+θ1 − θ2 = μ
£







0 − qpM (z0,t)
¤
(10)
where μ is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint, while θ1 and θ2 are
the Lagrange multipliers of the inequality constraints, z0 ≤ z ≤ ¯ z.
There are four cases to be considered. The analysis of Cases 1-3 provides a
proof of Proposition 2 (Industrialization), while Proposition 3 (Mass Consump-
tion) is proven in the discussion of Case 4.
Case 1: z0=z= ¯ z (traditional economy) In this case, all production is
done at home using the traditional technology. The most complex want that is








This corresponds to the pre-industrial economy in which the set of wants
that are satisﬁed remains constant over time. This will be the optimal solution
as long as the following inequalities are satisﬁed
γ ≤ μpS (¯ z,t),
(1 − γ) ≥ μ
£







0 − qpM (z0,t)
¤
for z0 = z =¯ z =2
1
2. Substituting in for pM (z0,t)=e−gtzλ





pM (z0,t),a n dz0 = z =¯ z =2
1
2, and combining the three inequalities






































Case 2: z0=z< ¯ z (industrialization with marketization of services)
































Combining (11) and (12) and integrating (13) yields two simple equations











































Equations (14) and (15) deﬁne an upward and a downward sloping curve in the
(¯ z,z0) space, respectively. It is straightforward to see that ∂¯ z/∂t > 0 as both
curves move upward with productivity. The eﬀect of technological progress on
the upper bound of the set of wants that are home produced using the traditional
























































<0 (second order conditions)
< 0.


























γ < (1 + q), the expression in
Proposition 2.













































Case 3: z0<z= ¯ z (industralization without marketization of ser-





















Using (18) we obtain a simple log-linear solution for the upper bound of the set of
wants produced with the traditional technology logz0 = 1
1−λ log(1 + q)−
g
1−λt.
Clearly the upper bound on the set of wants that are consumed (z)i n c r e a s e s
overtime.






γ > (1 + q) and t ≥ t0.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2. The discussion of Case 4 provides
a proof of Proposition 3.
Case 4: z0<z< ¯ z (rise of mass consumption) This corresponds to




















28z0 − (1 + q)e−gtzλ





















e−gt¯ zλ+1 − e−gtzλ+1¤
=1 .
(23)







< 1+q and t>t 1.


























+l o g¯ z
Finally, using (23) it is straightforward to see that ¯ z and z increase over time.












































































































































In the model with durable intermediate (capital) inputs, the household’s prob-
lem simpliﬁes to
max
B(t), z(t), d(t), ¯ z(t)
Z ∞
0



















The Hamiltonian of this problem is given by




















The Principle of the Maximum implies
u0 (C)γ = θps (¯ z,t) (24)
−˙ θ =( r − ρ)θ (25)









































and an equation for the equality of marginal cost of durables to the marginal
return of durables






ps (¯ z,t) (29)
Holding Company’s Problem
We assume that there is a competitive holding company that owns the capital
stock used by the market sector. In particular, the holding company purchases
manufacturing goods and rents these for a rental price R(z,t) to maximize the





e−rt[R(z,t)k(z,t) − I (z,t)pm (z,t)]dzdt
subject to the law of motion for each type of capital
˙ k(z,t)=I (z,t) − δk(z,t)




{[R(z,t)k(z,t) − I (z,t)pm (z,t)] + κ(z,t)[I (z,t) − δk(z,t)]}dz
Necessary conditions are:
κ(z,t)=pm (z,t)
































































(r + δ + g)
1 −
qm
nm (r + δ + g)
eλz−gt (32)
where a bounded price of manufactured goods requires 1−
qm
nm (r + δ + g) >
















(r + δ + g)




nm, αs = αm = α.
Balanced Growth Path
For a balanced growth path we need to have z (t)=z (0) +
g
λt and ¯ z (t)=
¯ z (0) +
g










= r − ρ − g + g
or


























































































(r + δ + g)
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(r + δ + g)
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eλ(¯ z(0)−z(0)) − 1
¢ (33)
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nm > 0,t h e n∂A








eλ(¯ z(0)−z(0)) − 1
¤










(r + g + δ)+1> 0.
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